Let’s wait and see how it goes

THE GENERAL expectation of many observers, this one not excepted, was that the invitation to Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO would be postponed at the Madrid meeting since what Turkey wanted these countries to do and what they had indicated they would be willing to commit themselves were far apart. To the surprise of many, by making mutual concessions, the parties found sufficient ground to move ahead. A three-page agreement has been signed. The evaluations not only in the government-friendly press of Turkey but also in European and American papers is that Turkey has achieved its major aims, crediting Mr. Erdogan with having pursued a successful policy.

Whether an agreement is successful can only be judged in time. There are too many examples of international agreements signed with good intentions but never fully or satisfactorily implemented. Hence, the tri-partite agreement will also have to be judged with the passing of time. Let us begin by noting that Finland and Sweden have historically been reluctant to join alliances and felt that their security would be best served by staying neutral. They have changed their stance as a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, which they feared would eventually challenge them if they did not receive the protection of the powerful security organization NATO. Their membership, the procedures of which will take time to be completed, will pose two types of questions to these governments. First, they are not used to being a part of an alliance. They were free to devise their foreign policies and even thought that they were morally superior in the way they approached international politics. Learning to behave as a member of the alliance may be a painful but and somewhat problematical process. Second, if there is substantial change in Russian behavior, they might lose some of their zeal in joining NATO.

One of the critical factors that proved difficult for Turkey and, in particular, Sweden to come together was the extensive support the latter had been extending to YPG/PYD while also providing a home to the PKK despite its insistent pronouncements that it considered the PKK a terrorist organization. Now Sweden has agreed no longer to support the YPG/PYD and to enhance its vigilance against the PKK. It is appropriate to ask whether Sweden would in fact be able honor its commitments in view of its domestic political realities. Swedish public opinion, with its do good mentality, believes that their government is supporting innocent victims of harsh policies of the Turkish government. Therefore, it may not receive anti-PKK policies warmly. The fact that there is a substantial Kurdish population in the country (more than 100,000) that are not only capable of influencing public opinion but also possess votes, is a political reality that cannot be overlooked. What is worse, the current government is maintaining the confidence of the Swedish parliament with the single vote of a woman of Kurdish origin who has made her support for the government contingent on its pro-YPG/PYD policies.

A commitment by both Finland and Sweden is to support a role for Turkey in the planned European defense system (PESCO). In view of the fact that the American commitment to defend Europe is at best tenuous and depends who happens to be in power in Washington and that a major political entity may not carry much clout in the international system unless it also has significant military capabilities, it is necessary that the European Union address questions of joint defense more closely than it has been able to do so far. It is also evident that European defense has to be conceptualized in a broader framework than incorporating just members of the EU, since some actors whose contribution to European defense, like Great Britain and Turkey, are not members, is critical. A European NATO, however, currently appears improbable. So far, it has not proven possible for Europeans to organize a credible defense without American leadership. Now that NATO has identified Russia as a principle adversary, it has become all the more important to plan more carefully for European defense, but progress, if it happens at all, is likely to be slow. It is nice to know that Finland and Sweden will support Turkey’s plans to become a part of a European defense organization when the process starts moving at a faster pace.

Finally, the two countries have promised to respond to Turkey’s extradition requests promptly. While this is encouraging, here the burden also falls on Turkey, which has to learn that these requests need to be prepared according to the requirements of European Extradition rules rather than the impressionist and circumstantial style that characterizes the operation of the Turkish judicial system and its extradition requests.

And the last thing, now that he is seen to be successful, it might be helpful if the Turkish president changes his dramatic communication style and allow ordinary diplomacy to determine the Finnish and Swedish relationship as he tends to other matters of equal import.